

demagogic propaganda. They might curse the workers for having an easier life than they had in the trenches and repeat the nonsense about German money as the cause of the March upheaval, but by no stretch of imagination could I visualize them siding with Guchkov or Miliukov and helping the reactionaries destroy the new order.

The Soldiers' Section decided on a large-scale goodwill campaign at the front. Delegations from large mills and factories in Petrograd were sent to the front with gifts from workers to the men in the trenches, as an expression of solidarity between the two groups. The delegations were instructed to distribute the gifts personally to each company. The campaign went on for several weeks and reached the most remote sections of the front. Friction between the soldiers in the trenches and workers was not completely eliminated, but angry soldier delegations disappeared from the Petrograd scene. By this time, however, night meetings in factories and military barracks had become routine in Petrograd, and I had more than my fair share of emergency calls after midnight.

THE CAMPAIGN FOR PEACE AND NATIONAL DEFENSE

The response to the message the Petrograd Soviet had addressed to workers and Socialist parties abroad was disappointing. Within Russia the reaction was mixed. The great majority of the public understood the message as a demand that the Provisional Government renounce the aims for which the Tsarist government had waged the war, such as the acquisition of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, the old dream of Russian nationalists. The masses of the people—peasants, workers, soldiers—instinctively approved scrapping all Russia's territorial aspirations. On the other hand, the conservatives were enraged by the desire of the Soviet to dictate foreign policy to the government.

There was no evidence that German and Austrian workers took the message of the Soviet seriously. In contrast, the German High Command answered it with a promise that its troops would not fire at Russian positions so long as the Russians did not attack. The purpose of this offer was clear: a *de facto* truce on the eastern front would facilitate Germany's operations in the West.

The French and British governments considered the Soviet's appeal a threat to their plans. After the heavy reverses in 1915 and 1916, both countries had planned to prosecute the war with increasing vigor, counting on the eventual entry of the United States into the conflict. A possible withdrawal of Russia from the Alliance would have been a